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Abstract
The paper deals with the importance of common knowledge based on shared memory for 
the character of social cooperation. The findings are based on the background of Serbian 
experience with dealing with the past. The stabilization of a common stock of knowledge is 
valuable for establishing sustainable patterns of cooperation. The nexus between shared 
knowledge and different modalities of action is elaborated. Fearful and trustful actions are 
taken as basic modalities. Both are concerned with uncertainty over time and coping with 
the freedom of others as independent agents, but they evoke different expectations con-
cerning the prospects of possible cooperation. The common assumptions of mutual expec-
tations are crucial for the choice of cooperative strategy. Trustful cooperation is based on 
relying on others, while fearful action is based on an apprehension of threat. A “history of 
play” informs parties on mutual expectations. The irreducibility of shared memories shows 
that institutional incentives and signals are not able to stabilize shared knowledge on 
mutual expectations. The paper suggests that different conceptualizations are linked to dif-
ferent modalities of action and that rebuilding damaged relations requires shared recon-
struction of a history of mutual relations. The thesis relies on a substantive argument about 
the particularity of common knowledge and a general argument based on the formal struc-
ture of social cooperation.
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‘I told you the truth,’ I say yet again, ‘Memory’s truth, because 
memory has its own special kind. It selects, eliminates, alters, 
exaggerates, minimizes, glorifies, and vilifies also; but in the 
end it creates its own reality, its heterogeneous but usually 
coherent version of events; and no sane human being ever trusts 
someone else’s version more than his own.’
Rushdie, Midnight Children
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The thesis argued in the paper is that a common knowledge of circum-
stances of cooperation based on shared memory is the irreducible and nec-
essary ground of social cooperation. An essential part of any pattern of 
social cooperation is the knowledge we have about each other and about 
mutual expectations. That it is irreducible means that it cannot be either 
replaced by any set of institutional incentives or reduced to the social 
hierarchy of power.1 Institutions and power relations are able to structure 
pattern of cooperation, but they are able to that only so far as they are 
supporting (or disrupting) confidence in common knowledge on existing 
motives for cooperation. That a common knowledge on mutual expecta-
tion is a necessary condition of cooperation2 implies that parties in coop-
eration need a common ground and that they have to rely on each other, 
one way or another. Otherwise, the respective mode of action is domina-
tion or some other ordered form of action rather than cooperation, and 
parties are caught in non-cooperative equilibrium based on hierarchical 
relations and/or mutual fears.3
The character of cooperation is dependent on the mutual expectations 
of parties, expectations that are partially based on a conceptualization of 
relevant previous experiences. Government and elites cannot put under 
full control the common knowledge of parties of their respective history. 
They are not able to invent friends and foes, but they are able to destroy 
friendships and create foes. The publicly shared stock of common knowl-
edge, which is crucial for creating a sustainable pattern of cooperation, 
cannot be invented: This possibility supposes a highly implausible “matrix” 
scenario based on comprehensive and perfect manipulation. The formal 
1) Martha Minow, for example, has argued the opposite thesis, that “the alternation of 
forgetting and remembering itself etches the path of power” (Minow 1998: 119).
2) Parties have to trust each other in some degree in order to enter into cooperation. The 
content of common knowledge is another question. According to Russell Hardin, a minimal 
condition is that parties have an “encapsulated interest” in cooperation. They know that 
they have to cooperate more than once and that cooperation is mutually beneficial (Hardin 
2002: ch.1). Bernard Williams has argued that recognition of the moral (intrinsic) value of 
trust in particular groups is essential for cooperation in order to establish a sustainable pat-
tern of long-term activity inside the group (Williams, 2002: ch.5). Presumably, content-free 
game theoretical explanations presuppose that parties are equally rational and that they 
have minimal “as if” mutual expectations.
3) John Rawls distinguished three differences between social cooperation and “merely 
coordinated action.” According to Rawls, social cooperation, unlike coordinated action, 
includes: a) publicly recognized rules and procedures, b) the idea of fair terms of coopera-
tion, and c) the idea of each participant’s rational advantage. (Rawls 1996: 16)
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and substantive structures of the logic of cooperation are important nor-
mative constraints on the side of third parties willing to intervene. On the 
other hand, common knowledge of mutual expectations is substantive 
and particular and does not have a unique institutional and social expres-
sion. It depends on the content of the history of mutual relations and its 
interpretation.
Accordingly, any sustainable pattern of social cooperation relies on three 
overlapping and irreducible backings: an institutionally structured back-
ground, the social distribution of power and the distribution of knowledge 
of mutual expectations. In this paper only the third aspect is discussed. 
The thesis is elaborated against the particular background of the Serbian 
experience of dealing with a difficult past. The inability of Serbian society 
to articulate common experience is an obstacle to collective action and 
undermines Serbia’s trustworthiness and reliability in international coop-
eration. For this reason, the argument in the paper begins with the identifi-
cation of some pathologies of public interpretation of the common past of 
Serbian society. The focus is on divisive aspects of collective memory and 
their effects on the stability of patterns of cooperation. The argument pro-
ceeds with a brief elaboration of the shortcomings of the institutional 
approach to the problem of trust. The next part consists of the elaboration 
of different nexuses between memory, trust and fear as modes of actions. 
The final section explores different modes and effects of political interven-
tion in the content of public memory.
The argument in the paper is normative because it appeals to the good 
reasons everyone has to accept the intrinsic value of trustful cooperation 
and to take part in collective efforts at the articulation of the common stock 
of shared knowledge. For this reason, some valuable contributions, espe-
cially on the part of certain radical leftist thinkers, are omitted in the dis-
cussion. Their argumentation is far beyond the scope of this paper.
Pathologies of collective memory: Serbian case
The Serbian political arena is a battlefield of opposing memory judgment. 
Different layers of the past are a heavy burden for political society in Serbia. 
Disagreements about the interpretation and meaning of the past are 
charged with disruptive political potential and open a window to divisive 
memory battles. The well-known case of Kosovo is probably not only 
the crucial political issue of the moment, but an interesting case of the 
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politically effective presence of the distant past as well. The other hot top-
ics emerging from the recent past are the dissolution of FRY and the subse-
quent violent wars, war crimes, and NATO military intervention against 
Serbia. The Srebrenica declaration was only narrowly passed in the Serbian 
Parliament, with lots of reservations and compromises -including those 
about the missing word genocide4- whereas the declaration on Serbian vic-
tims unanimously passed in the Parliament. The official manhunt for Ratko 
Mladić, an indicted war criminal, was accompanied with furious activism 
on the part of right-wing groups propagating Ratko Mladić as a Serbian 
hero, etc. The political memory work is even more obvious at the lower 
levels of quasi-political activism. Public life as well as everyday life in Serbia 
is saturated with unresolved quarrels that emerge from the recent or more 
distant past (Kuljić 2006).
These are some of the fixed points in Serbian political memory that lack 
adequate political articulation. A more general problem of Serbian political 
society is that “missing articulations” are serious obstacles for collective 
political action. Commenting on Serbian troubles in coming to terms with 
its own past, former Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić (assassinated in coopera-
tion with members of regular police units and criminal groups on March 
12th, 2003), in the article devoted to the first anniversary of October 5th, the 
day when Milošević’s regime was overthrown, noticed that Serbs and their 
elites are not able to recognize their own greatest historical events as victo-
ries (cf. Molnar 2010: 256). This is probably the main reason why Serbia is a 
state with very few bank holidays, only one of which is a national historical 
date celebrating a political event. This is the date of the enactment of the 
first written constitution on February 15th 1835, and it is usually poorly 
celebrated.
What is at stake in these divisive “memory wars” is the memory of real 
wars waged during the last decade of the 20th century. Serbia was defeated 
in these wars, but the nature of that defeat is a matter of bitter (and some-
times violent) political contestation. Serbian political society is divided 
along these lines in at least three opposing political camps, making it 
impossible to establish rational political communication among them and 
4) The Serbian Parliament has passed (March 31th 2010) the text of a resolution condemning 
crimes committed in Srebrenica in July 1995. The resolution apologizes to the families of 
victims and states, “The parliament of Serbia strongly condemns the crime committed 
against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995, as determined by the 
International Court of Justice ruling.” The resolution was adopted by a majority of 127 of the 
173 representatives present in the 250-seat assembly.
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to bring their positions closer. For the nationalists, it was a military defeat 
in the unfair battle against the new American imperial project. It was an 
ideological (for some, identity-based) conflict and Serbia has to endure in 
her political fight against imperialism. For the moderate, it was the defeat 
of an unreasonable political project, and Serbia needs a more pragmatic 
political approach. Liberals believe that it was the defeat of an immoral and 
shameful nationalistic project and that Serbia needs a new political 
approach based on a radical reconstruction of political identity. Political 
parties are divided along these lines.
Serbia is probably a dramatic case in its need to come to terms with its 
own past, but it is not an exception. Memory studies in the last three 
decades have demonstrated that a new “guilt of nations” appears with the 
democratization of history and claims of moral responsibility for the past. 
Assumed responsibility presents a heavy burden on the legitimacy of the 
states, especially in international relations (Barkan 2007). The Serbian 
record in the international political division of moral responsibility is infa-
mous. In addition, Serbia shares the common reputation and record of the 
Balkan states (Bjelić i Savić 2002). The term balkanization became the 
B-word, a profane words referring to something dangerous, bad and ugly. 
The word balkanization is a byword for political dissension and enmity 
among small and fragmented political units. The Balkans is an area divided 
into small warring states burdened with eternal instability and turmoil, an 
area occupied by nations obsessed with history and unresolved conflict 
coming from the distant past.
Against the background of the Serbian experience it is possible to articu-
late a normative thesis about the importance of stabilizing the content 
of public memory in order to stabilize patterns of social cooperation. 
Shared memory is an important public good because it provides a concrete 
public conceptualization of the collective social experience as a basis of 
orientation and action. Divisions and failures in articulation might have 
serious consequences. According to Bruce James Smith: “Where the images 
of the past and the affections which attach to these (and around which the 
action is organized) decay or are pulled apart, where human beings have 
forgotten or no longer agree on what Walter Lippmann called ‘the first and 
last things,’ there is opened up ‘a great vacuum in the public mind, yawning 
to be filled,’ and men rush in only to exhaust themselves” (Smith 1985: 4).5  
5) Bruce Smith recognized three important roles public memory plays in the stabilization of 
patterns of social and political cooperation. First, continuity between individual and public
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The same word, “yawning gap,” is used by James Booth in a different context 
to refer to the loss of memory, which in turn can undermine the wholeness 
of society and the continuity of association across time. This hole in mem-
ory “can be pathological, a ‘gangrene’ in their midst” of community (Booth 
2006: 179). In other passages of the book, he refers to deep holes in memory 
as “tectonic plates” of memory, unpredictable in their ability to “undermine 
reality.”
More general reasons for the importance of public memory are grounded 
in some formal features of social cooperation. Elaborations of the formal 
structures of cooperation in game theory show that stable and efficient 
cooperation is a more complex and fragile enterprise than is usually 
assumed. The modality of cooperation among individuals as well as among 
groups depends on the common knowledge of expectations of parties 
entering into cooperation. The substance of this common knowledge is 
important. If the parties believe that cheating is a dominant pattern of 
action, they will be trapped in the game of securing assurance against oth-
ers whom they suspect of desiring to win at the expense of the other. 
Expectations ascribed to the other party determine rationality of action 
and the character of the game. It is never rational for one party in coopera-
tion to play according to established rules if she is the only player who 
plays honestly. In the absence of stabilized patterns of cooperation within 
a more settled background, every agent or group of agents risks that other 
parties will not do their part after they have done theirs. Nobody likes to 
be a “sucker” or “loser” in the cooperative game. If we expect someone or 
everyone else to cheat, it does not make sense for us to play a fair game, or 
to play at all. The common knowledge of the character of the game defines 
the cooperative equilibrium in a particular society. The society of cheaters 
is trapped in non-cooperative equilibria and required to play corruptive 
games.
It is an exaggeration to qualify any existing society as a society of cheat-
ers, but most societies are trapped in a stable but inefficient equilibrium. 
(collective) memories is essential for building stable and meaningful social and political 
ties. This thesis relies on Walter Lippmann’s work Public Philosophy. Second, political mem-
ory is a kind of concrete conceptualization that reduces political action to stories, images, 
and habits. This conceptualization is able to preserve the virtues and vices of action and to 
transfer this knowledge to others. This is what he found in the works of Machiavelli, Burke 
and Tocqueville. Third, the shared stock of memories has to be large enough to create a 
“fabric of understanding” and provide means for the perpetual reconceptualization of polit-
ical memory.
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More specifically, this is an equilibrium rising out of the social division of 
knowledge of the respective past that divides population into mutually dis-
trustful groups.
Two approaches: institutions and shared memory
The kind of behavior expected on the part of others can be established 
through institutional assurances of common knowledge of the character of 
the game and the legitimate expectations of the actors. This is an assump-
tion behind Rawlsian theories of the well-ordered society:
If men’s inclination to self-interest makes their vigilance against one another nec-
essary, their public sense of justice makes their secure association together possi-
ble. Among individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of 
justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general desire for justice lim-
its the pursuit of other ends. One may think of a public conception of justice as 
constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association (Rawls 
1971: 5).
The assumption is that a particular type of institutional arrangement could 
provide assurance to all parties sufficient for them to enter into coopera-
tion for mutual benefits and without further fears concerning the motiva-
tion of the others.
Taking into consideration Rawls’s own reinterpretation of his theory and 
introduction of two additional assumptions of the reasonableness of the 
parties and character of public reason introduced in the book Political liber-
alism, it is safe to conclude that the institutional solution is insufficient.6 
Two different games may be played according to the same set of institution-
alized rules (assuming that a fair play game and a rotten game are different 
in character). Trust in public institutions is not only the outcome of norma-
tively justified institutional expectations. The interpretation of the history 
of citizens’ real experience in dealing with a particular set of institutions is 
6) Note Sen’s general argument on the limitation of the institutional approach: it is possible 
in a single society for a perfectly just arrangement of social institutions to exist alongside 
grave injustices in particular cases (Sen 2009). These difficulties are not necessarily deficien-
cies in Rawls’s theory if it is not interpreted as a general solution of the problem of coopera-
tion but as an articulation of particular experience in dealing with public institutions. 
Rawls is ambiguous on this question in A Theory of Justice, but gives preference to the second 
interpretation in later works.
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a good reason for trusting or distrusting the institution. The functioning of 
political institutions depends on the citizens trusting their leaders as well 
as believing in the values and ends of institutions, not just on rules, incen-
tives and signals that institutions generate.
Relying on the formal analysis of Amartya Sen (2002, 2009) and Bernard 
Williams (1988, 2002), we may conclude that there is no general solution to 
the problem of cooperation.7 Williams says: “The problem of cooperation 
cannot be solved merely at the level of decision theory, social psychology, 
or the general theory of social institutions. In fact, there is no one problem 
of cooperation: the problem is always how a given set of people are to coop-
erate.” (Williams 1988: 13) These theoretical findings are supported by many 
empirical studies (Gambetta 1988, 1993; Rothstein 2005; Tilly 2005).
Thus, it is necessary to look behind institutional incentives. The “history 
of play” informs parties whether to rely on the others (or institutions) in 
a cooperative enterprise. The interpretations and knowledge of history 
are deposited in the shared memory of a particular group. “[P]resent 
experience was not punctiform, but included a ‘comet’s tail’ of just-past 
experience, a phenomenon to which he [Husserl] referred as the ‘living 
present’” (Danziger 2008: 181). Decisions are always made in a context 
already “saturated by memory.” But there is no unique ethical or political 
expression of shared memories. Memory brings opposite normative possi-
bilities in its wake. It is able to do justice and fuel conflict, provide identity 
and terrorize. The dark side of memory is usually delegated to the memory 
of traumatic experiences, but it includes more than this. There are many ills 
that memory brings with it. One is the ability of memory to “keep alive 
ancient hatreds” that “have fueled conflicts around the globe.” Memory 
keeps ‘wounds green’ and the embers of conflict glowing” (Booth 2006: 177). 
Another is what Dubravka Ugrešić calls the “terror of remembrance” 
(Ugrešić 1998: 81), which emerges from the “surfeit of memory” (Nietszche, 
Meier, Blustin). The pressure to keep the common past alive is seen as a 
burden and obstacle to action.
Different conceptualizations of shared memory give rise to different 
modalities of action. Thus, in the next part of this article, the nexus between 
a shared memory and two basic modalities of action – fearful and trustful 
actions – will be briefly elaborated.
7) Sen has concluded that every new situation has capacity building new “mutual conex-
tions’” and that boundaries of these connections are going beyond institutionalized struc-
tures: “There are few non-neighbors left in the world today” (Sen 2009: 173).
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Memory, Trust and Fear
John Dunn recognized that trust is “both, a human passion and a modality 
of human action” (Dunn 1988: 73). Along the same lines, it is possible to 
analyze the relation of trust and fear as two different, sometimes opposite, 
modalities of action.8 Both are concerned with uncertainty over time and 
coping with the freedom of others as independent agents,9 but they bring 
different expectations concerning the prospects of possible cooperation. 
Trust is a necessary condition of any cooperative activity, and it includes 
“the willingness of one party to rely on another to act in certain ways” 
(Williams 2002: 88). It is not necessary that motives be altruistic or friendly; 
“the willingness” implies only that cooperative situation is not an occa-
sional but a long-term activity between mutually recognizable parties. 
According to Williams, “A may have reason to believe that B is a trustworthy 
person, in the sense that in situations of trust he is generally disposed to do 
what he is expected to do just because he is expected to do it” (Williams, 
ibid). “Reasons to believe” are embedded in a particular history of interper-
sonal relations as well as in social institutions. In this sense, trust is not just 
a human passion, supposing that we are able to affect our unreflective feel-
ing of confidence in some situations. It is about the relation of trustworthy 
persons, usually mediated by social rules. A trustworthy person is a credible 
partner in cooperation for mutual benefit. If we regard trust as a modality 
of action, the interesting questions are how we can describe a situation of 
trust given the history of relationships and what we can do (or what policy 
is appropriate) to build, rebuild or repair social structures of mutual trust 
among free and independent agents (Dunn 1988: 88).
Fear brings different expectation in cooperative situations. In the situa-
tion of fear, parties expect harmful actions on the side of others. It is also 
assumed that the other party is capable of doing the harm. An apprehen-
sion of threat is essential for fearful action. Parties in fearful situations tend 
to exit the cooperative situation or to assure themselves against harms. The 
methods of assurance are sometimes extreme, but they are rational from 
8) Trust and fear as attitudes/disposition admit of degrees. According to values ascribed to 
them in a particular situation it is possible to analyze an expectations according to ascribed 
values. Absolute trust and absolute fear are mutually exclusive, but this is probably true for 
any value above some threshold.
9) The circumstances of trust are described along the lines of German sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann 1988.
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the subjective point of view. Consider an extreme example analyzed by Bo 
Rothstein:
But if one ethnic group cannot rely on the other ethnic group to accord respect to 
principles of equal treatment and nondiscrimination, it is pointless for the first 
group to do so. To cite an extreme (but sadly not at all unusual) case, it may seem 
rational to try and ethnically cleanse the neighboring village today if you are 
entirely convinced that the villagers are waiting only for reinforcements in order 
to attack your own village the next day (Rothstein 2005: 20-21).
Regular cases imply that assurance may have less dramatic, institutional 
forms. However, complex institutional guaranties against uninvited and 
feared outcomes increase the costs of cooperation and present an obstacle 
to efficient collective action. Along these lines it is possible to analyze polit-
ical development and institutional logic in the case of divided societies. 
Unfortunately, this is not the exceptional case.10 The interesting question 
here is what is relevant for the process of forming conviction that some 
individual or group is a clear and present danger.
The answers to the abovementioned questions depend partly on the 
interpretation of the particular history of the relationships between parties 
involved in cooperation. Trustfulness or fear are not determined by a deci-
sion to trust someone or not to fear someone or something. It is possible to 
decide to enter into cooperation despite risk and danger, but this is a risky 
and brave action, not an action based on a trustful and fearless pattern of 
cooperation. For person A it is possible to rely on the actions of person B 
only if A believes that they share knowledge of mutual expectations and 
A is confident that B will do his part. Otherwise, someone is pretending that 
he is in a trust relation with the other. Naturally, one may have false assump-
tions about mutual expectations or anwrong appreciation of the other’s 
credibility, but this is the case in asymmetrical trust relations, not distrust-
ful relations. Shared knowledge of expectations is not provided only 
through institutional frameworks. Common knowledge is acquired through 
a network of social practices that result in a common stock of knowledge. 
The notion of shared memory is used to refer to an important part of 
this stock. According to the substance of the stock, self-conceptions and 
10) As Michael Ignatieff has put it, “In the twentieth century, the idea of human universality 
rests less on hope than on fear, less on optimism about the human capacity for good than on 
dread of human capacity for evil, less on a vision of man as a maker of his history than of 
man the wolf towards his own kind” (Ignatieff 1997: 18-19).
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conceptions of others are constructed.11 Empirical evidence based on 
neuroscience as well as the social sciences shows that these conceptions 
are highly stable and difficult to change (Kandel 2006; Rothstein 2005: 21).
There are four features of memory that explains the stability of memory 
at an individual as well as collective level. The first is that an important part 
of memory is involuntary. The effacement of memories is not an operative 
mode of forgetting (Ricoeur 2004: 414). As the psychological literature 
shows, traumatic experiences are highly stable: The more one tries to 
forget them, the more vivid they become (Frey 2004). Second, memory is 
omnipresent in the way that it is impossible to imagine oneself stripped of 
all memories. Cases of amnesia or partially distorted memory are well-
known examples. Besides that, as has already been mentioned, we are 
always making decisions “in the horizons saturated by memory.”12 Third, 
memory tends to create a coherent version of events. Memories are built-
in, a kind of cognitive (mental) map, and changes in part of them require 
changes in other parts.13 To change them, it is usually necessary to rear-
range the whole construction. Fourth, once established as part of a coherent 
version of events, memory-based judgments become epistemologically 
privileged. This suggests that a) other things being the same, someone 
believes her own version more than someone else’s, b) even in the presence 
11) According to Jeffrey Blustein, Professor of Bioethics at Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine, memory is normative and particular at the same time, because it includes a “nor-
mative self-conception” based on: a) retrospective reconstruction of the meaning of the 
past, b) appropriation of the past as my (or our) own past, c) selective thematization of the 
past episodes; d) interconnections of the previously listed. (Blustein 2008: 66 – 76, 84-86).
12) The same observation (in a different context) can be found in Karl Marx’s memorable 
passage from The Eighteenth Brumaire: “Men make their own history, but they do not make 
it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circum-
stances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead gen-
erations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be 
occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist 
before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits 
of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in 
order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed 
language.” <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm> 
(accessed on December 15, 2011 ).
13) The same is true for trust and distrust. As Daniel Weinstock has put it: “distrust, like 
trust, is stubbornly evidence-resistant” (Weinstock 1999: 301). Fear is even more stubborn in 
its persistence against contrary evidence. The widespread fear of snakes is a well-known 
illustration of this thesis.
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of inconclusive scientific evidence. Memory-based judgments are difficult 
to change despite their unreliability.
A methodological warning is needed: I am not assuming that memory is 
an autonomous and self-designative practice, only that it is irreducible. 
“Remembering ceased to be something that people just do without being 
conscious of what they are doing” (Danziger 2008: 7). The fact that different 
concepts, models, practices are introduced and induced changes the nature 
of memory. Besides the biologically constrained equipment of an individ-
ual, “memory concepts, technology, mnemonic values, institutional prac-
tices and memory performance [are] linked in a network of reciprocal 
influence.” (Danziger 2008: 9). All of these are included in the creation of a 
“heterogeneous but usually coherent version of events” – what Rushdie 
calls “memory truth.” However, the veracity of the representation is not the 
issue here; what is more important is that we use these representations to 
orient ourselves in physical and conceptual space. We recognize these rep-
resentations as a part of memory because they are linked to direct past 
experience, reconstruction of traces of past events or someone’s reliable 
witnessing. For that reason, memory is recognized as fragile and often 
unreliable, but no less important because of that. This process has its own 
“logic” that establishes a particular nexus between memorization, remem-
brance, recollection, and different modalities of actions.
The political elites of the former Yugoslav republic (in all its political 
forms) underestimated the power of the “autonomous” logic of communi-
cative memory – group memories built on different, formal and informal, 
social practices. The same is true (the other way around) for official 
interpretations of the respective history of the states established after 
breakdown of Yugoslav federal state. The official efforts of political elites 
to establish a dominant ideological or national pattern of interpretation 
of the history of mutual relationships collapsed against the background of 
particular interpretations mediated through long-lasting mnemonic pat-
terns. It does not matter whether the official narrative was about “brother-
hood and unity” or “heroic national suffering in a hostile environment.” The 
interesting question is what kind of modalities of actions arose out of the 
interplay between different conceptualizations of individual and group 
“real” experiences with institutions and others and shifting institutional 
settings promoting their own interpretation of mutual history. The thesis, 
yet to be empirically confirmed, is that interplay between different “auton-
omous” conceptualizations and shifting institutional settings could explain 
the extreme commutation of modalities of actions, ranging from brutal 
<UN>
 Dj.Pavićević / Southeastern Europe 37 (2013) 179–199 191
enmity to civic friendship. Given the multiplicity and complexity of Serbian 
historical narratives, the other question is what kind of political interven-
tion is appropriate for the stabilization of a common stock of knowledge 
about the individual and collective past.
Political memory and common knowledge
The stabilization of the content of memory is not easy to achieve, espe-
cially after periods in which “gifted historians” fan the spark of hope for a 
redemption that is coming from the past.14 These are efforts to fill deep 
holes in memory as “tectonic plates” of memory, unpredictable in their 
ability to undermine reality. Memory battles over filling this gap, in John 
Keane words, are “times during which the living do battle for the hearts, 
minds and souls of the dead” (Keane 1988: 204). These are periods of politi-
cal crisis and danger. It is not surprising that at the dawn of war in former 
Yugoslavia this kind of war was waged by writers, historians, linguists, foot-
ball fans, believers, etc. of different nations and ethnic backgrounds. As an 
illustration there comes to mind the bizarre memory war waged in the 
beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, in which skeletons of real and alleged vic-
tims of national and ideological massacres during WWII were dug up from 
mass graves. Skeletons were reburied according to appropriate religious 
ceremonies without serious identification or forensic analysis. In spite of 
this, the media were full of horrific pictures and reports of victimization on 
ethnic and ideological grounds perpetrated in the past by enemies who 
present actual danger (Ustashi, Communists, Chetniks).15
14) Walter Benjamin warned of the role of preachers and prophets in period of danger: 
“Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly 
convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has 
not ceased to be victorious.” In every society, especially “in the moment of danger,” an 
“attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to 
overpower it.” (Benjamin 1968: 255).
15) The heroic effort of a group of historians to clean up the history of the Balkans from 
hostility and the ghost of violence remains almost unnoticed in Serbia despite a translation 
and separate Serbian edition (Koulouri 2005). The problem with these materials is that they 
leave many open and contested questions unaddressed. The strategy of the authors was to 
pick and choose selected documents in order to achieve overlapping intepretations and to 
contibute to breaking the memory wars in SEEC’s by providing alternative teaching materi-
als. Neither national authorities nor historians recognize the value of this effort.
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Newly promoted public knowledge gave rise to ancient fears and hatred. 
Nevertheless, fears and hatred were not invented.16 They were made pres-
ent in actual memory through well-known mnemonic practices. Mnemonic 
practices were used to make it seem credible that Serbs, Croats or Muslims 
were once again ready to commit genocide against the respective ethnic 
group. Political intervention in the social milieu of memory has a tendency 
to abuse memory. Political abuse of memory is a kind of manipulation with 
the aim of justifying or legitimizing a “system or order or power.” It is a cor-
ruptive form of political memory, for it tries to establish hegemony of the 
ruling memory (Ricoeur 2004: 82-83; Northon 1993; Radstone and Hodgkin 
2003).17 The political abuse of collective memory is not necessarily always 
counterproductive.18 The problem of interventionist abuses is that they are 
unstable and that these instabilities are able to bring society over to one 
side of the political axis or the other. Serbia is the actual case in question. 
Intervention brings different content to the fore and offers an alternative 
conceptualization. It is an open question whether these interventions 
are able to induce a change in shared memory and how this is possible. 
Almost anything may be the object of political misuse, but not everything 
is changed due to political intervention.
The concept of stabilization refers to the state of equilibrium of different 
memories that have a capacity for resistance to displacement and a ten-
dency to recover after displacement, either in their original position or in 
new stable equilibria. The problem of stability is defined in mathematics, 
physics, economy and biology along these lines. Simply put, political mem-
ory is stable if it survives the period of crisis and disturbance. Several types 
of equilibrium could be described as stable depending on the kind of politi-
cal regime, ethical burdens and demands, the content of history and the 
nature of mnemonic practices. What is important is the nexus between 
individual and group memories on the one hand, and public memory on 
16) A good example is the book on political fear written by Corey Robin. Her analysis shows 
that the political definition of the object of fear is “almost always preyed” either on some real 
threat or on existing “social, economic and political [threat] that divide[s] a people” (Robin 
2004: 16, 18). Fear is always about the appreciation of threat.
17) Paul Ricoeur suggesting that it is possible to apply an idea of justice to the stabilization 
of content of corrupted public memory. Application of the idea of justice to the memory 
“comes through our reflection on the abuses of a memory manipulated by ideology” (Ricoeur 
2004: 68).
18) Timothy Snyder demonstrates this in the case study of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine 
(Snyder 2006).
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the other. The quality of this link depends on certain general features of 
political memory and the persistence of the irreducible content of memory, 
which cannot be tamed by public memorization (eg. informal mnemonic 
practices, traumatic experiences, mass crimes).
For the reconstruction of the logic of stabilization of political memory, 
three ambivalent characteristics of political memory are important. 
Political memory a) is a privileged regime of social memory; b) it is inter-
ventionist; and c) it pretends to authoritativeness.
a)  The privileged status of political memory stems from its relation to 
political power. It is a memory of power, but at same time constituted 
and influenced by power. Power brings order to the stock of different 
political memories. From the period of its formation, the state takes a 
triple role in the formation of political memory: as producer of history, 
record keeper and agent of memorization.19 In order to achieve this 
task, authority tends to establish “regimes of temporality” reproduced 
through mnemonic practices. These are regimes of common remem-
brance and common forgetting. However, it is impossible to establish 
supreme control over the interpretation of the past. As Reinhart 
Koselleck argues in his study of the semantics of temporalization under 
the effective title Future Past, the present (memory) is always under the 
influence of the future past – the horizons of past expectation – and 
there is no power capable of getting rid of them.
b)  Political memory is the subject of a deliberative politics of memory 
aimed at certain important values: peace, reconciliation, justice, democ-
ratization. These policies include a variety of legal, administrative and 
political measures that bring to the public a political imperative of 
remem -brance.20 Their value and effectiveness is widely analyzed in 
19) Hegel was among the first to recognize and articulate these intentions on the part of 
states. In his Lectures on Philosophy of History, G.W.F. Hegel stated that “the uniform course 
of events […] is no subject of serious remembrance; though distinct transactions or turns of 
fortune, may rouse Mnemosyne to form conceptions of them […]. But it is the State which 
first presents subject - matter that is not only adapted to the prose of History, but involves 
the production of such history in the very progress of its own being” (Hegel 2001: 76-77).
20) Melissa Williams (1998) has argued that historical discrimination continues to exist in 
collective memory and that its working is corruptive of social and political ties. The bonds 
of trust between majorities and historically discriminated minorities can be repaired by 
ensuring group representation in institutions, thus ensuring that they have a robust stake in 
the decision-making process.
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different political contexts, under the flourishing disciplines of the poli-
tics of memory and transitional justice. The aim is to intervene in the 
“spontaneous” or “natural” course of individual and communicative 
memory in order to correct its fragility, corruption and natural tendency 
of forgetting unpleasant events. This is a kind of distribution of memory 
work based on the impossibility of everyone to remember everything all 
the time. At the same time, it is a corruptive form of memory tending to 
establish a hegemonic interpretation of the past.
c)  Political memory pretends to be an authoritative memory: duty- 
based memory supported by consideration of legitimacy. What is at 
stake is political morality, the possibility of mnemonic transformation 
of a body of formal commands and laws into lasting and binding 
obligations. Consideration of legitimacy depends on a kind of corre-
sponding memory regime. Truth-based memory regimes prefer discon-
tinuity between individual and group memories on the one hand 
and public memory on the other. A good illustration of this position 
is Hannah Arendt’s statement: “The best that can be achieved is to 
know precisely what was, and to endure this knowledge, and then to 
wait and see what comes of knowing and enduring.” (Arendt 1968: 20). 
On the other hand, identity-based memory regimes would prefer 
continuity in combination with responsibility. What is important is 
the protection and preservation of identity-related memories (Margalit, 
Booth). Democratic regimes prefer recognition through critical contes-
tation (Bell 2008; Markell 2006). The difficult cases are those that 
include memory of traumatic experiences, mass killings, and massive 
violations of human rights. No political memory regime is able to stabi-
lize public memory on that basis. These cases have to be addressed 
on the basis of universalistic moral imperatives rather than on a politi-
cal memory regime. These considerations go well beyond the present 
argument.21
There are different political ways to bring shared memories home. Some of 
them are deflective. Deflection arises from different interventions in the 
21) The importance of ethical considerations for the stabilization of collective memory 
in post-mass-crimes periods is minutely elaborated by Nenad Dimitrijević. The thesis 
advocated in the book is that the Serbian political community has to rebuild its own 
identity on universal ethical imperatives, because no effort of political stabilization 
could be morally legitimized. The book goes far beyond the thesis advanced here 
(Dimitrijević 2011).
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public stock of common knowledge. Different interventions bring different 
possibilities in their wake. Nevertheless, interventions are an inherent part 
of mnemonic practices. Mnemonic practices are not innocent and sponta-
neous. But they have an inherent logic that is difficult to change. As 
Danziger in his A History of Memory shows, memory is a cluster concept 
comprising different processes and phenomena. Memorizing information 
is the process comprising the encoding and storing of information in sym-
bolic forms. Remembrance refers to the process of inscription and retain-
ing information in a material medium. Recollection, recalling, retrospection 
or reminiscence are different types of retrieval and decoding of informa-
tion. It is not clear how autonomous this process is and how much it 
depends on external memory tools and technologies. Some variables 
include: a) the content of memory is dependent on mnemonic values that 
are cultural in character; b) the process can adapt itself to different mne-
monic practices and technologies, and c) changing the concepts of mem-
ory has an influence on the memory process. Furthermore, the concept has 
a long history including many shifts in meaning and changes in mnemonic 
practices. It is difficult to compare mnemonic technique and concepts 
of memory of ancient bards and storytellers, or a medieval student practic-
ing Ars Memoriae to memorize large portions of Holy Scripture or Latin 
grammar, with a person who memorize how to use meta-mnemonic tools: 
pin codes and passwords, organizers and reminders, databases and search 
engines.
There is a tension between different kinds of interventions and mne-
monic practices. Some features of shared memory make common knowl-
edge more stable and less accessible to deliberative interventions. Power 
and institutions take part in shaping common history and knowledge. 
Despite this, common history and the stock of knowledge remain contest-
able and open to interpretation. This is an important substantive con-
straint. Political attempts toward the collectivization of shared memory 
and placing it under control are always open to serious suspicion. Stability 
of conceptualization does not presuppose that it is not liable to change. On 
the contrary, only the regime of shared memory open to “perpetual public 
reconceptualization” is capable of stability. In spite of this, there are no 
guaranties that a common knowledge would become a “fabric of under-
standing” and mutual trust among citizens more than a fabric of corrup-
tion, fears and hatred. The more complex and troublesome the history, the 
more effort is needed for establishing a sustainable pattern of cooperation. 
In order to be seen as a trustworthy partner in cooperation, more than 
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declared apologies for wrongful past are needed.22 To rebuild credibility 
presupposes that agents link efforts in reconceptualization with modalities 
of action in other to reconstruct a history of mutual relations.
Conclusion
The conceptualization of common knowledge and shared experiences is 
an important public good. A shared stock of knowledge provides the means 
for public orientation and action. The substance of conceptualization is 
decisive for the choice of a dominant modality of action among partici-
pants in cooperative enterprises. Different conceptualizations give rise to 
the choice of different strategies. Trustful and fearful actions are taken as 
examples of actions based on the parties’ mutual expectations. The essen-
tial part in the constitution of shared expectations is a “history of the game.” 
We make judgments on the integrity or credibility of others, as well as 
construct our own self-conception, according to previous experiences. 
These self-conceptions and conceptions of others are highly stable and 
evidence-resistant. Due to the nature of mnemonic practices and features 
of memory-based judgments (memory truths) these conceptions are diffi-
cult to change. History cannot start again anew every day, as in the movie 
Groundhog Day. For that reason, deliberate interventions in memory 
practices are unpredictable in their ability to produce pathological forms of 
public memory (unhappy memories).
Serbia is a clear case of divisive memories at work. Public life looks 
like a plateau for different – sometimes pathological and offensive – 
interpretations of the past. Every one of them has a political expression. 
The problem is that the recent past cannot be framed by old mnemonic 
patterns. Existing mnemonic practices cherished a Serbian past of heroic 
22) The seminal form of apology for collective wrongdoing was established by Wily Brant’s 
famous action of kneeling down in front of the monument to victims of the Warsaw 
GhettoUprising. Political representatives of former Yugoslav states expressed their apology 
for the collective wrongdoing during wars waged in the 1990s in different forms and occa-
sions. These apologies are often apprehended as empty political gestures without substan-
tive moral meaning for the victims. The loose moral meaning of apologies and the difficulty 
of decoding the moral meaning of official apologies generally are elaborated in Nick Smith 
2008. He states: “I describe how apologies often convey muddled or deceptive sentiments 
and I prescribe means of decoding such gestures,” or “Bad apologies, like spoiled fruit, do not 
satisfy our primal needs” (Ibid: 10, 1).
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freedom fighters, always on the right side in historic battles. There was no 
place for mass murderers, war criminals, torturers etc. The self-conception 
of Serbians is still resistant to historical evidence and resilient enough to 
absorb systematic faults as aberrations and incidents. A hope that institu-
tional incentives for dealing with the past will provide the means for a dif-
ferent conceptualization barely survives. The outcomes of the Tribunal in 
the Hague (ICTY) or criminal procedures in front of Serbian courts are 
highly poor in this respect (Petrović 2010). The same is true for Parliamentary 
declarations, official apologies and new historical textbooks. Rebuilding 
damaged relations is more complex than giving institutionalized incen-
tives and signals. Otherwise, a new football game or thoughtless statement 
is able to once again fan a spark of hatred that emerges from the past.
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